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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN POLICE INTERROGATION
CASES: Miranda and Williams•
The cases involving police elicitation of co_nfessions from a suspect have been a source of great public concern. 1 One recent case,
Brewer v. Williams ,2 is significant because it rejuvenated a theory
of constitutional protection for suspects which had been dormant
since the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois. 3 It is
also significant because to most observers the case appeared to
concern issues of police interrogations under Miranda v. Arizona. 4
Yet, the Court determined that Miranda was inapposite and stated
that Williams rested on the sixth amendment's guarantee of the
right to the assistance of counsel 5 rather than on Miranda and the
fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 6
This article will consider some of the theoretical and practical
ramifications of the Williams decision and compare its protections
to the protections offered by Miranda. The article, focussing on the
right to counsel, discusses the nature of the police conduct which is
prohibited by each decision, the time at which the protections involved become effective, and the standard by which a waiver of the
rights will be measured. The article concludes that there may be
significant differences in the application of the two cases and that a
uniform rule based on the sixth amendment may be superior to the
present approach.
To understand the decision in Williams, it is important to be
familiar with the facts 7 of the case. Pamela Powers was abducted
*This article was developed from research done for Professor Yale Kamisar at the University of Michigan Law School. I wish to extend special thanks to him for his guidance in developing the theme of this article.
1
Kamisar, Foreward: Brewer v. Williams -A Hard Look at a Discomfitting Record, 66
GEO. L.J. 209, 209 (19n) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, Williams-Record] ("In recent decades few matters have split the Supreme Court, troubled the legal profession, and agitated
the public as much as the police interrogation-confession cases.").
2 430 U .s. 387 (1977).
.
3 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Interestingly, the Iowa state courts had considered only the
Miranda question. See State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970).
5
The pertinent section of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
• The ilfth amendment reads in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
7
This article will refer to the facts as reported by the Supreme Court. The actual facts are
different in several important aspects. See Kamisar, Williams-Record, supra note I.
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from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa on December 24, 1968. On December 26, Henry McKnight, an attorney in Des Moines, received
a telephone call from Williams, then in Davenport, Iowa, who confessed to involvement in the Powers case and asked for advice.
McKnight told Williams to surrender to the Davenport police,
which he did. The Davenport police read Williams his Miranda 8
rights and informed the Des Moines police of the surrender. Detective Leaming and a fellow officer were dispatched to bring Williams back to Des Moines. While still in Davenport, Williams was
arraigned. He consulted at that time with an attorney named Kelly.
When Detective Leaming arrived, he repeated the Miranda warnings and told Williams, "I want you to remember this [the warnings] because we will be visiting between here and Des Moines. " 9
Kelly requested, but was refused, permission to ride with Williams. Kelly then reminded Detective Leaming of an agreement
Leaming had made with McKnight not to interrogate WiHiams until
their arrival in Des Moines. During the 160-mile trip Williams
stated several times that "[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see
McKnight I am going to tell you the whole story. " 10 Leaming and
Williams had a wide-ranging discussion which culminated in Leaming' s delivery of the so-called Christian Burial Speech 11 in which
Leaming lamented the fact that they would be passing the place
where the body was hidden but that the snow fall would soon cover
the body so that she would never be found and her parents would
be denied the opportunity to give her a decent Christian burial. Williams asked why Leaming believed they would be passing the location of the body on the way back to Des Moines. Leaming responded that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville.
This was a guess. Leaming closed the conversation by stating, "I
don't want to discuss it further. Just think about it as we're riding
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that a suspect be warned of his right to
remain silent and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 391.
10 Id. at 392.
11
Detective Leaming is reported to have made the following speech:

I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be
dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight and I
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is,
that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you
yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on
the way to Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we
should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying
to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id. at 392-93.
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down the road. " 12 As the car approached Mitchellville, Williams
directed the officers to the body. Williams never confessed to the
murder in any way other than by his action of locating the body,
but such an action is treated by the courts as confession. The Court
stated that Williams was protected by his right to counsel and the
speech was tantamount to an interrogation, thus violating that
right. 13 The Court disagreed with the Iowa state courts, and upheld
the federal court view that Williams had not waived his right to
counsel. 14
I.

PROHIBITED POLICE CONDUCT

Both Miranda and Williams have the same ultimate effect - the
exclusion of self-incriminating remarks from the suspect's trial.
Each accomplishes the task based on a different notion of what the
police have done wrong. Thus, the two approaches may reach different results in different circumstances.
Before discussing the theories of each case it is helpful to review
the possible forms of police conduct which may be called into question. The court often refers to the prohibited police conduct as "interrogation." That word, however, may cover a broad range of activities. This article instead will refer to questioning, inducement
(or interrogation), and elicitation. Questioning is the asking of
questions designed to produce self-incriminating responses. 15 Inducement is police conduct which includes not only questioning
but also other forms of conduct which have the effect of coercing
or compelling the suspect to incriminate himself. This conduct may
be as horrifying as dropping a basin of the deceased's bones into
the lap of the suspect, 16 or as subtle as giving the suspect a pamphlet describing the dangers of carrying narcotics within one's
body . 1 7 To determine whether there has been inducement, the
courts look for the presence of coercion. Because Miranda has had
such an overwhelming impact in the confession area, and because
the Miranda Court referred to the coercive police conduct as ''custodial interrogation," 18 the word "interrogation" has come to be
associated with inducement. 19 By contrast, elicitation encompas12

Id. at 393.
Id. at 400.
14 Id. at 401-06.
15 The police may ask questions which do not have as their purpose the production of a
self-incriminating response. The police may, for example, ask "administrative" questions.
See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699, 704-05 (1974).
1 • Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
17 United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977).
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
19
See notes TI-82 and accompanying text infra.
13
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ses a broader range of activities. It includes conduct that may or
may not be coercive, but that is nevertheless calculated to produce
a self-incriminating response. Custody, however, can add a coercive aspect to any form of police conduct. 20
Massiah v. United States 21 provides an example of the distinction between inducement and elicitation, and of the confusion surrounding these terms. Mr. Massiah had been indicted for smuggling
narcotics into the country. Unbeknownst to him, his accomplice,
Colson, agreed to assist the prosecution. Colson arranged a meeting with Massiah which was recorded by federal agents. The comments made by Massiah were excluded from his trial, as a violation
of the sixth amendment. Although the Court referred to the police
conduct as "surreptitious interrogation, " 22 there was no evidence
of an interrogation in that there was no coercion. Massiah spoke of
his own free will. It would be more accurate to describe the conduct as deliberate elicitation, 23 since it evoked a self-incriminatory
response without coercion.

A. Brewer v. Williams
It is difficult to determine the breadth of the proscribed conduct
in Williams, since the Court's opinion established an interrogation
requirement, and then determined the constitutional violation
based on precedent which related to deliberate elicitation, not interrogation. Specifically, the Court stated it would have found "no
such constitutional protection [under the sixth amendment] ... if
there had been no interrogation. " 24 On the other hand, the Court
relied on the decision in Massiah which prohibited any deliberate
elicitation of remarks by a federal officer after the suspect's indictment.25 It is possible that the Court meant to describe the same
conduct with the terms "interrogation" and "deliberate elicitation." But, as noted, they have come to be differentiated by the
presence of coercion. Thus, one question posed by Williams is the
role coercion plays in the application of the sixth amendment. 26
20

See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 Tux. L.

REV.

203, 230

(1975).
21

377 U.S. 201 (1964).
/d. at 206.
23
/d. The reference to "surreptitious interrogation" may be explained by the fact that the
court of appeals decision in Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), dealt with the application of
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 ( 1959). Spano involved an interrogation in that there was
coercion. The majority in Massiah quoted Judge Hays' dissent from the Second Circuit decision. It was Judge Hays, not the Supreme Court majority, who first used the phrase "surreptitious interrogation." 307 F.2d at 69.
2
• 430 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 400-01.
26 See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "lnterro22
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A review of the history of the application of the sixth amendment·
to self-incrimination cases reveals the source of the confusion. The
sixth amendment's application has rested on two interrelated
analyses. The first is based on the view that police actions constitute a critical stage of pre-trial proceedings and that the suspect is
protected by the right to counsel. In line with this analysis, the
Court has frequently stated that without the presence of counsel to
investigate and prepare the accused's case, and to provide needed
legal advice in the early, "critical" stages of a criminal prosecution, the right to counsel at trial is meaningless. 27 Although the
Court has used such reasoning to apply the right to counsel primarily to judicial pre-trial proceedings, the theory could be extended to
police actions as well, since the results of police activity can be as
critical to the eventual trial as other activities. 28 Under this theory,
coercion is not particularly important. Voluntary but uncounselled
statements made at pre-trial judicial proceedings can be excluded
from use at the trial. 29 Whether this holds true for police proceedings will be explored below. 30
The second basis for the application of the right to counsel to
police interrogation cases is to resolve the problems of coercion associated with police interrogations. These problems relate to conduct that threatens the suspect's fifth amendment rights, although
it was not until Miranda that the fifth amendment was declared applicable to police conduct. 31 Prior to Miranda, the Court had relied
on the voluntariness test to determine the admissibility of confesgation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. l (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, What
Is Interrogation?].
27
See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932), in which the Court stated:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their
trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally
important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial it•
self.
28
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398 (citing Powell); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201,205 (l964)(citingPowell). See also Spano v. Ne~ York, 360 U.S. 315,325 (l959)(Douglas, J ., concurring); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 512 (1958) (Douglas, J ., dissenting);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29
See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). Professor Kamisar has suggested a
helpful way to think of this. If the prosecutor were attempting to discover information from a
defendent during the trial and did so by trickery, such information would probably be
excluded even if it were voluntarily given. Interview with Yale Kamisar, Law Professor at
University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Feb. 19, 1979).
30
See notes 53-69 and accompanying text infra.
31
The Court previously had held that the compulsion proscribed by the fifth amendment
referred to judicial compulsion (that is, compulsion exercised by the force of law) and not
police compulsion, because the police had no right to punish a person who did not speak.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REV. 59, 65, 77-83 (1966).
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sions. 32 This test was criticized because the Court could not be
sure of the facts since the cases often presented swearing contests
between the police and the suspect. 33 Even if the facts could be determined, the test was also criticized as too illusive. No one was
sure what "voluntary" meant. 34
The application of the sixth amendment's right to counsel to
police interrogations was seen by some members of the Court as a
device to resolve the problems with the voluntariness test. The
right was thought applicable because the production of a confession has such an enormous impact on the eventual trial. 35 More
importantly, the right to counsel was believed capable of improving
the conditions of the police interrogations. Counsel could inform a
suspect of his rights, deter the police from engaging in nefarious
conduct, and provide an independent source of facts. 36 Although
several justices desired to impose limitations on police conduct
through the sixth amendment, Miranda, a case in which both fifth
and sixth amendment interests culminated, suggests that the primary concern of the Court was defendant's fifth amendment interest- the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 37 Thus,
the presence of coercion or compulsion plays an important role in
the application of the right to counsel under this analysis of the
sixth amendment.
The view that the presence of counsel in police interrogations
was desirable gained majority acceptance in 1964 in Massiah 38 and

32 See Brown v. Mississippi, 2'I7 U.S. 278 (1936). In determining whether a confession
was vohmtary, the Court took into consideration possible violations of fifth amendment
interests. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
33 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), is a good example of the problem with the
voluntariness test. Justice Frankfurter's 67 page plurality opinion descnbes in great detail
the factors to be used in measuring voluntariness. Three other Justices agreed with the
standards set forth but reached the opposite result. See generally Kamisar, A Dissent from
the Miranda Dissents, supra note 31; Kamisar, What is an Involutary Confession?, 17 RUT-

L. REV. 728 (1963).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,685
(1961)):
GERS
35

Without the protections flowing from ... the rights of counsel, "all the careful
safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."
36 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 314, 325-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Crooker
v. California, 457 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 439:
[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
38

377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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Escobedo v. Illinois. 39 These two cases, however, demonstrate the
differences in the two justifications for the application of the sixth
amendment. Voluntariness and the fifth amendment were not at
issue in Massiah, since the suspect spoke of his own free will. 40
Massiah is, therefore, best analyzed as an application to police
procedures of a traditional sixth amendment theory of the right to
counsel. 41 The Court held that just as the suspect cannot be denied
the right to counsel during critical stages when he most needs the
right, so can the police be proscribed from purposefully circumventing the right once the right has commenced. 42
By contrast, Escobedo involved the use of coercive psychological ploys to produce a confession. Escobedo knew his attorney was
outside the interrogation room and requested to speak with him,
but his request was denied. The police engaged in a long, secret
interrogation which culminated with their bringing an accomplice
into the interrogation room and Escobedo claiming that it was the
accomplice, rather than himself, who pulled the trigger. 43 The
Court analyzed the case in terms of the right to counsel and held
378 u .s. 478 (1964).
See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,312 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
381-82 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Massiah marked no new departure in the law. It
upset no accepted prosecutorial practice .... In no case before Massiah had this Court, at
least since Powell v. Alabama, ever countenanced the kind of post-indictment police interrogation there involved, let alone ever specifically upheld the constitutionality of any such
interrogation .... "). When Massiah was decided, several commentators believed it dealt
with the meaning of compulsion under the fifth amendment and not with the right to counsel.
Enker & Elsen, Counselfor the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois,
49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 57 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1%3 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143,221
(1964). Enker and Elsen questioned the right to counsel reasoning in Massiah by noting that
if Colson had volunteered to help the state after he had his conversation, the right presumedly would not have arisen. Enker & Elsen, supra at 56-57. Thus, they argue, the real
meaning of Massiah is that the state somehow drew a confession out of Massiah and such
activity is more closely related to the fifth amendment. Williams, however, clearly rejects
the fifth amendment analysis of Massiah. 430 U.S. at 397. The Court in Massiah could be
understood to assume that after a given point the suspect requires the assistance of an attorney in his interactions with the state. Since Massiah had passed that point, it was his right to
have his attorney advise him as to any communications made with the state. In turn, the
state was proscribed from engaging in such conversation by surreptitious means. Massiah
did not have a right to advice concerning all possible conversation, but was protected against
state action that initiates or gathers information.
42
The Court viewed indirect interrogations as posing a greater threat to constitutional
rights than secretive police practices:
39
0
•
41

It is true that in the Spano case [Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)] the defendant was interrogated in a police station, while here the damaging testimony was
elicited from the defendant without his knowledge while he was free on bail. But, as
Judge Hays pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, "if such a rule is to
have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well
as those conducted in the jail house. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a
government agent."
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (emphasis added).
43
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 482-83. Escobedo was held for murder under the Illinois felony-murder rule.
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that once the police had focused their investigation on a suspect,
that suspect was entitled to the protections of the right to counsel.44 Nevertheless, the true concern of the Court appeared to be
the protection of the suspect from the compulsion of police interrogation.45 In Miranda the Court analyzed Escobedo as a case designed to protect fifth amendment rights, 46 and later cases have
completely stripped Escobedo of any sixth amendment value. 47
A review of the cases indicates the difficulty in analyzing Williams. While the decision claims to rely on Massiah, the facts are
more similar to Escobedo. Moreover, the justices discuss in the
opinion the coercive impact of the Christian Burial "interrogation, "48 despite the seeming irrelevance of coercion under Massiah. The best interpretation of Williams is as a traditional sixth
amendment case. This is apparent by noting that the case could
have been decided under Miranda but was not. Williams was
clearly in custody 49 and the Court found the Christian Burial
Speech to be tantamount to an interrogation. The Court could, accordingly, have found under Miranda that Williams was improperly subjected to custodial interrogation. 50 The fact that the Court
specifically rejected Miranda and appeared to draw a line between
the fifth and sixth amendment interests indicates that Williams
does not rely on the Miranda theory of interrogation, but on the
sixth amendment analysis of Massiah. The overriding concern of
Miranda is the element of compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. 51 In contrast, the Massiah doctrine affects police conduct
which is often, but need not be, coercive. Thus, if the Court was
primarily concerned with the application of Massiah rather than
Miranda to the facts in Williams, the decision proscribes deliberate
elicitations and the use of the world "interrogation" is misleading.52 The presence of coercion should, therefore, have little direct

•• Id. at 490-91.
•• See Enker & Elsen, supra note 41, at 61.
•• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465.
47 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,689 (1972) ("[T)he Court in retrospect perceived that the
'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such,
but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination
.. .'.").See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
•• See note 13 supra.
49 See notes 8-14 supra.
• 0 What the result would have been had it been a Miranda case is an open question. Compare Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1385-86 (lm) (the confession would be admissible under Miranda)
with Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 72-74 (the confession would be inadmissible under Miranda).
51 See note 37 supra.
·
52 See Karnisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 33-34. One could argue that
"interrogation" has a different meaning when applied to the sixth amendment, as opposed
to the fifth amendment. There is, however, no reason to engage in such semantic confusion
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impact on the determination that the right to counsel has been denied.
The broadest interpretation of "deliberate elicitation" suggests
that any statement by the suspect to the state is inadmissible~ This
interpretation is based on the idea that there is an analogy between
police and judicial pre-trial proceedings. The voluntariness of a
statement made at a pre-trial judicial proceeding would, under this
interpretation, not be relevant; 53 if the right to counsel were not extended during such a proceeding, the statement could not be used.
Some courts have so interpreted Massiah. 54
The breadth of such a conclusion is troubling to some. It
suggests, for example, that a statement which is merely overheard
might be excluded on the basis of the suspect's sixth amendment
right. 55 Furthermore, such a conclusion is in conflict with the
statement in Miranda that voluntary statements are not to be
excluded. 56 These concerns may have troubled the Court and they
therefore required that the police must take some action that interferes with the suspect' s ability to use his right to counsel. The
police may approach the suspect only through his attomey 57 or in a
manner consistent with the suspect's right to invoke the sixth

when the phrase "deliberate elicitation" more accurately describes the proscribed conduct
under Miranda.
53 See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
54 Shortly after Massiah was decided, the Court decided McLeod v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 356
(1964). McLeod was a one sentence reversal of an Ohio Supreme Court opinion which had
held that Massiah did not apply to a voluntary confession made in a face to face confrontation. State v. McLeod, l Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964). Several courts relied on
Massiah and McLeod to hold that, after indictment, even voluntary statements which were
not elicited by the police could be excluded in the absence of a waiver of the right to counsel.
United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied
sub. nom. Yeagerv.O'Connor, 395 U.S. 923 (1968); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (I st Cir.
1967).
The Ohio courts seem to have interpreted McLeod to mean that, once indicted, the suspect is entitled to be informed of his right to counsel before interrogation. State v. Arrington,
3 Ohio St. 2d 61,209 N.E.2d 207 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 906 (1966).
55
One court has held that overheard statements are admissible. See United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (l978)(rejecting a clai·m by
Patty Hearst that the introduction of a tape recording made of a discussion between Hearst
and a friend via an intercom system at the jail was a violation of Williams), discussed in note
flJ infra.
56
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478. Other courts share this interpretation by holding
that Massiah must be read in the light of Miranda, which allows voluntary statements to. be
admitted. See United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947
(1971); State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 366 A.2d 1026 (1976) (collecting cases). The effect of
such a reading is to completely subsume Massiah into the Miranda analysis. See United
States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d ll03 (9th Cir. 1974); Blizzard, 278 Md. at 568, 366 A.2d at 1032
(''An overwhelming majority of the courts in this country have been restrictive in their application of Massiah and McLeod."). This appeared to be the predominant theory of Massiah's status until Williams distinguished Massiah from Miranda.
57 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he lawyer is the
essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen.").
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amendment as a protection from police inquiries. 58
The_ nature of the interference depends upon the circumstances
of police involvement. In Massiah the police had interfered because
they subjected Massiah to an attempt to get information in which
his ability to assert his right to counsel was rendered meaningless
by the secrecy of elicitation. In Williams, however, the suspect
realized he was confronting the police. The Court found that the
right had been circumvented because the Christian Burial Speech
had such an impact on the psyche of Williams that he was rendered
incapable of rationally deciding when he should interpose his right
to counsel. 59 The dissenters disagreed and argued that the Speech
was not coercive and that the past assertions by Williams indicated
his ability to cut himself off from the police. 60 Thus, contrary to the
notion that deliberate elicitations do not depend on the presence of
coercion, the Court may be indicating that in face to face confrontations with the police, a suspect's right to counsel is circumvented
only by coercive police conduct. This is the narrowest possible interpretation that can reconcile the Court's conflicting notions of
the need for "interrogation" and its reliance on Massiah. Deliberate elicitation refers broadly to deceptive actions by police, but
would reach no further than interrogation when the suspect recognizes who he is confronting. This narrow interpretation is troubling, however, because, as noted above, in the circumstances of
Williams it is not appreciably different from the protection against
compulsion already provided by Miranda. 61
A middle ground can be·established for interpreting Williams, in
which all statements are not excluded but where the exclusion is
broader than Miranda. It is certainly possible, for example, that an
interrogation which was undertaken while the suspect was not in
custody would constitute a violation of the right to counsel but
•• See United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354,358 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947
(1971) ("[T]he crucial feature of both Massiah and McLeod was the deliberate acquisition of
information by police from a suspect under circumstances preventing his effective exercise
or waiver of his right to counsel .... ").
•• 430 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The detective demonstrated once again that
the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by
more sophisticated modes of persuasion.").
60 430 U.S. at 418 (Burger, J., ·dissenting); 430 U.S. at 433-37 (White, J., dissenting); 430
U.S. at 439-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61 One might argue that the presence of compulsion in Williams serves a different purpose
than it does in Miranda. The argument thus far has been that the compulsion in Williams has
the effect of rendering a suspect incapable of asserting his right to counsel. One could argue
that such coercion is different from the coercion necessary to compel a self-incriminating
remark. This is certainly true where the suspect does not realize he is speaking to a state
agent, as in Massiah. As to face to face confrontations, the argument is meaningless. First,
the police pressure which creates a confession also creates a pressure to refrain from asserting one's right. Second, Miranda is not limited to combatting the police pressure to confess.
It also refers to the pressure to relinquish one's right, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467
("In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
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would not trigger Miranda. 62 It is also possible that Williams
means to include a broader range of activities under the rubric of
"deliberate elicitation'' when the suspect is in custody than is covered by Miranda. 63 Both of these examples raise the issue, which
remains unresolved in Williams, as to how much the police must do
before their activity becomes an elicitation. The different descriptions of proscribed conduct reflect the differences in focus between
the Miranda and Williams decisions. Under Miranda the focus is
on the presence of compulsion which violates the fifth amendment.
Coersion is a necessary condition for such a proscription but not a
sufficent condition because there must also be custody. Under Williams the focus is on the interference with the right of the suspect
to interpose his attorney between himself and the state. A wider set
of activities falls under this proscription and coersion is a sufficient
condition, but not a necessary condition.
The application of Miranda in custodial circumstances was
based on the assumption that the inherently coercive pressures of
custodial interrogation may cause many suspects to relinquish their
rights. The notion that the police can render a suspect incapable of
interposing his right to counsel in face to face confrontations without coercion appears to rest on an assumption that the suspect does
not always act in his own best interest. 64 A contrary assumption

privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively ap•
prised of his rights and the exercise of these rights must be fully honored.") (emphasis added).
•• See United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1973). Miranda
relies on the synergistic effects of both custody and interrogation which create an inherently
coercive situation. The difficulty posed regarding Williams is whether the Court will require
proof of coercion in fact or whether the mere asking of a question will constitute a deliberate
elicitation.
The Supreme Court case which came closest to reaching this issue is Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa was overheard by a government agent planning the bribery of the Test Fleet jury. Hoffa argued his right to counsel had attached because, under
Escobedo, the police had focussed the investigation on him. Once the right attached, heargued, the statements overheard by the agent were inadmissable under Massiah. The Court
argued in rejecting Hoffa's Miranda claim that there was no inherent coercion. The Court
rejected the right to counsel argument, but appeared to do so on the theory that the right had
not attached and not on the grounds that no right to counsel argument was available. In a
footnote the Court commented that had Hoffa been indicted for bribery, the decision would
have been more· difficult.
Any police action. which was not preceeded by a warning of the right to counsel, even if
not in custodial surrounding, should, of course, constitute deliberate elicitation, since the
police would be taking advantage of the ignorance of a suspect and thus rendering him incapable of effectively using his right. McLeod was held to mean the police must warn a suspect of his right to counsel. See note 54 supra.
63
Compare text accompanying note 65 infra with text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
64
This is not an unreasonable assumption. The basis of the right to counsel is, presumably, to assure the suspect that he will be represented in the best possible way. See Johnson
v. 2.erbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 ("[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition
of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to
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suggests that so long as the suspect is informed that he has a right
he will know how to use· it in the absence of compelling pressures
to relinguish the right. How completely the Court accepts this assumption will have an effect on which police activities it will classify as deliberate elicitations and what actions will constitute a
waiver of the right to counsel.
A significant example of the breadth of Williams and of the confusion over the word "interrogation" is provided by the situation
in which a suspect is placed in a jail cell with a "jail cell plant. " 65
The Massiah-Williams rule proscribes, once the adversary proceedings have commenced, the use of incriminating evidence
gatheredby the jail cell plant since Massiah, the precedent Williams relied upon, excluded the information that had been gathered
for all practical purposes by a jail cell plant. The fact that the secret
agent in Massiah operatedin an automobile, not a jail cell, makes
no difference. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in a recent case
held that the presence of a jail cell plant was not a violation of Williams because use of a jail plant dd not constitute an interrogation. 66 The Fourth Circuit has disagreed and overruled the use of
an admission in such a circumstance. 67 The presence of a jail plant
is a deliberate elicitation of information because it places the suspect in a situation in which the police can take advantage of normal
social pressures to speak 68 to a person inclose proximity and simultaneously render the suspect incapable of interposing his attorney
between himself and the state. 69
The requirement that the elicitation be ''deliberate" may limit
the scope of Williams. The majority seemed troubled that Detecprotect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to talce his life or liberty."). Such
protection is no less necessary when the suspect is confronted by the police rather than by
the prosecutor at trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469-74.
•• See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 55-69.
•• Wilson v. Henderson, No. 78-2015 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1978).
67 Henry v. United States, No. 77-2338 (4th Cir. Dec. 26 1978).
88
See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, supra note 20, at 230;
Driver, Confession and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 44-46
(1968) ("[T]o be physically close is to be psychologically close. The situation has a structure
emphasizing to the persons involved the immediacy of their contact .... ••).
69 The Second Circuit in Wilson v. Henderson, No. 78-2015 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1978), argued that Massiah did not render inadmissible all voluntary statements, but only those
which the police have elicited or, according to Williams, which were products of interrogation. Thus, the Court confused the notions of police action which forces the suspect to respond (interrogation) with action which interferes with the assertion of the suspect's right
(elicitation). This confusion is evident from the misuse of precedent. The cases cited for the
premise that Massiah did not affect all voluntary statements all involved face to face confrontations. It has been noted not only that these present a difficult application of the Massiah holding, but that in any case the focus should be on the ability of the suspect to use his
attorney as a shield. While in face to face cases the courts may search for activity which
prods the suspect, in surreptitious cases, such as the jail cell plant and Massiah, the state has
automatically removed the suspect's capacity to use his right to counsel by the very fact of
secrecy.
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tive Leaming knew Williams had retained an attorney but nevertheless attempted to compel a statement by removing him from the
presence of the attomeys. 70 Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued
that the no-passenger rule was reasonable and therefore the isolation was not deliberate. 71 This suggests that the Court will have to
resolve whether deliberateness means specific intent to gather the
information or a general intent to commit an act which has areasonable likelihood of producing a confession whether or not the
police officer recognizes such a likelihood. 72
The foregoing discussion interprets Williams as adopting the
right to counsel approach to problems of self-incrimination. This
The Wilson decision then turns for support to cases involving surreptious investigations:
United States v. Hearst, 503 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. Im), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978),
and United States v. Fiorvanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fiorvanti v.
Yeager, 396 U.S. 860 (1969). Fiorvanti is inapplicable since the suspect had not been indicted and thus his right to counsel had not attached.
Hearst is more difficult to analyze. While in jail, Patty Hearst was recorded by the police
speaking to a visitor on a two way communication device used by all prisoners and visitors.
The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed Hearst's argument because the mere presence of the
recording device was not an elicitation. The same argument might be made in Wilson - that,
unlike Massiah, the government agent merely listened and did not suggest the area of conversation. First, however, it is not clear that the agent in Massiah suggested an area of conversation, see Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 42 n.283 ("I submit that
the facts in Wilson are constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah.
There was no finding or any indication that Colson [the agent in Massiah] 'interrogated'
Massiah or asked him a single question."). Second, even if such a distinction existed it
would be dangerous to rely on it. The cases would be reduced to swearing contests between
the suspect and the agent as to who first mentioned the issue of the crime. Third, it is more
consistent with the Massiah-Williams doctrine of protecting the suspect's ability to interpose his attorney that any such communication be prohibited. The police must be proscribed
from circumventing the relationship between suspect, attorney and the state whether by
electronic or personal means. Finally, the Hearst court noted that the prisoners were aware
of the recording device. Although the court did not analyse this fact, it can be argued that
Hearst's knowledge of the police presence meant the police had to do more than collect the
information to breach the right to counsel. This view must not be overextended. It is no
protection to the right to counsel to inform a suspect that he will be recorded whenever he
speaks and to whomever he speaks.
These arguments were accepted by the Fourth Circuit in Henry v. United States, No. 77- ·
2338 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1978). The court noted that Massiah, McLeod v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 356
(1964), and Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967), all suggest a broad reading of the
proscription against police elicitations. The court also noted that use of the word "interrogation" in Williams was not meant to be a restriction on the holding of Massiah.
70
Williams' Davenport attorney, Kelly, asked to ride back to Des Moines with Williams.
This offer was refused. The Court noted that this allowed Leaming to act upon Williams in
isolation. 430 U.S. at 399. Isolation is generally accepted as a critical element in an effective
interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 449. The Court also noted that Leaming
had agreed with both attorneys not to interrogate Williams. Although the Court did not give
the agreement the force of a contract, it did note that the agreement reinforced the deliberateness of Learning's conduct. 430 U.S. at 401 n.8.
71
Brewer V. Williams, 430 U.S. at 438-39. See also United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d
1002 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (Im) (no violation of Massiah found where
state officers questioned suspect and responses were overheard by federal agents because
the state officers were unaware of the federal indictment).
72
See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 9 ("It seems to me ... that so
long as the police conduct is likely to elicit incriminating statements and thus endanger the
privilege, it is police 'interrogation' regardless of its primary purpose or motivation .... ");
Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967) (reversing a lower court holding that if the suspect arranges to meet with the government agent it is not a deliberate elicitation).
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approach proscribes any deliberate elicitation of remarks by the
police once the right has attached. Deliberate elicitation appears to
mean actions which interfere with the suspect's right to interpose
his attorney between himself and the state. When the suspect is
unaware that he is communicating to a state agent he is robbed of
this right. If the suspect is aware that he is addressing a state agent,
the Court must decide what forms of police activity will constitute
deliberate elicitations. The decision will be affected by whether a
suspect in such circumstances is capable of acting in his own best
interests and asserting his right to counsel or whether a suspect will
be presumed to need an attorney's assistance.
B. Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda held that suspects subjected to custodial interrogations
must be given certain wamings. 73 The prohibited conduct, in the
absence of warnings, is the custodial interrogation. 74 The Court
observed that such interrogations were inherently coercive and
warnings were therefore necessary to assure the suspect the ability
to assert his rights. 75 Since the custody issue has been considered
extensively, 76 the focus of the present discussion is upon the interrogation factor.
By narrowly construing the interrogation requirement, some
courts have limited the application of Miranda. 11 For example, one
73

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
After a person has asserted one of his rights under Miranda the protection may be
broader. The Court stated in Miranda that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege." 384 U.S. at 476. If the defendant does not voluntarily waive, any resulting confession is inadmissible.
75 See note 37 supra.
78
See generally NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS AFTER MIRANDA 5-29 (1975); Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within
The Meaning of Miranda, in INSTITUTE OF CoNTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CRIMINAL
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION I (1968); Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?''
California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 59
74

(1966).
77
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hodge,
487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190(8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972). C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (Criminal)§ 76, at 113 (1969), explains the limitations in terms of an expansive definition of voluntary statement:

[f]he breadth of the exception for volunteered statements ... seems to include ...
the statement of a person who has not been given the benefits of warnings and
counsel so long as he is not interrogated. If so, the police, so long as they ask no
questions, could deliberately hold ·a person in custody without giving him the
Miranda warning, and confront him with the victim of the crime, or perhaps other
evidence of it, in the hope that he would spontaneously say something incriminating.
But see Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 14 n.85 (arguing that Professor
Wright's view is too limited).
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court held that telling a suspect that the fingerprints found on the
dead body matched his fingerprints was not an interrogation but a
"firm one-way conversation. " 78 This holding suggests that "interrogation" under Miranda is limited to police questioning. However, this limitation ignores the intent, if not the letter, of Miranda.
The Court adopted the Miranda rule not to halt police questioning
per se, but to dispell the "badge of intimidation" inherent in the
police dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogations. 79 The
Court was concerned with any coercive conduct which renders the
suspect incapable of asserting his rights. Indeed, several of the interrogative techniques described by the Court in Miranda do not
involve the question/answer process. 80 By focussing on the interrogation issue, the Williams decision supports the view that
Miranda covers more than questioning. The dissenters in Williams
argued that the Christian Burial Speech was not a question and
therefore not an interrogation. 81 By finding the Speech to be an interrogation, the majority buries the myth that such acts are not"interrogations.' ' 82
Another apparent limitation on the scope of Miranda concerns
the source of the coercion. Miranda clearly applies when the coercion stems from dealing with a known police officer. 83 When the
coercion is from sources other than the police, however, the
applicability of Miranda is less clear. One court, for example, held
that asking the father of a suspect to convince the suspect to con-

78
United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099
(1977). But see Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 20 n. I 15 ("[I]f you wish
Miranda were overruled, the Davis-Pheaster approach is the next best thing.").
79 Some courts, particularly the Pennsylvania Court, have been astute in the protection of
the Miranda doctrine by looking _beyond the presence of a question to whether the police
actions were likely to produce a confession. See Commonwealth v. Mercier, 45 I Pa. 211,
302 A.2d 337 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969). See also United States v. Clark, 499
F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Doss v. Bensinger, 463 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Barnes, 432 F.2d 89, 90-91
(9th Cir. 1970); McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §152 (E. Cleary ed.
1972).
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457 n.26, 454 (pointing out the incriminating significance of the suspect's refusal to talk), 455 (resorting to "deceptive strategems such as giving
false legal advice"), 450 (displaying "an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt").
81 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 430 U.S. at
433, 434 (White, J., dissenting).
82 Compare United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (Court uses Williams to
expand Miranda and finds that the action of officers who gave an informational pamphlet
concerning the dangers of hiding narcotics in one's body constituted conduct tantamount to
an interrogation and therefore proscribed by Miranda) and United States v. Jordan, 557
F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 19TI), with Owens v. Commonwealth, 235 S.E. 2d 331 (Va. 1977) (refusing to apply the broader notion of interrogation in Williams to a Miranda case because the
cases protect different rights).
83 Miranda usually refers to "custodial police interrogation." See, e.g., Miranda
v.Arizona, 384 U.S. at 450.
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fess constituted illegal interrogation under Miranda. 84 By contrast,
another court held that asking questions of a suspect's wife in the
presence of the suspect, which the suspect answered, was not an
interrogation of the suspect. 85
Courts have also split on the question whether the use of a jail
cell plant violates Miranda. 86 It should be recalled that under the
better interpretation of Williams, the use of the jail cell plant violates the sixth amendment. 87 This conclusion follows because the
focus of the right to counsel is on the ability of the suspect to use
his right once he has it. The focus of Miranda, however, may be
somewhat different and therefore its application to this situation is
uncertain. Miranda has been viewed as no more than a prophylactic device to protect the fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 88 Under such an assumption one commentator has argued that Miranda does not cover the jail cell plant
situation 89 because Miranda was designed to combat the inherent
compulsion of inducements engaged in by recognized police officials. Specifically, the references to inherent compulsion in
Miranda go to the belief of most suspects that they must answer
the police or that the police can do them much harm if they do not
answer. These basic instincts, combined with the means to emphasize them through the interrogation devices described in
Miranda, give the police significant albeit inherent powers of compulsion. These pressures are absent in the situation in which the
suspect does not recognize the interrogator as a police officer. 90

84

United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1971). The decisions on this issue often tum on
whether the interrogator was an agent of the police. See United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d
68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. O'Kelley,
181 Neb. 618, 150 N.W.2d ll7 (1967).
86 Compare State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1976), with United States v. Fioravanti, 412
F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 637 (1969).
87 See note 61 supra.
88 Brewerv. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,581 n.6
(1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1974); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,688
(1972).
89
Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 55-69.
This is not to suggest that the fifth amendment does not apply as well. If the undercover
agent beats a confession out of the suspect it will be viewed as compelled self-incrimination.
An interesting and unresolved question is how the Court might treat the use of the interrogation techniques referred to in Miranda by an undercover agent.
•• The interrelationship of this issue with the above issue of Miranda's application when a
suspect is questioned by someone other than a police officer is clear. If the jail cell plant is
not a violation of Miranda because the suspect is unaware of the presence of the police, then
it follows that if the suspect is questioned by his father, or a murder victim's mother, then
the lack of "police blue" means such techniques are not violations of Miranda. Professor
Kamisar has taken such a view. Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 45, 48.
This article will eventually suggest that Miranda be viewed not solely as a prophylactic
device but as an application of the sixth amendment for the limited purpose of protecting
85
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The limitations on Miranda described above, along with the requirement that the interrogation must be custodial, suggest that
Williams involves a broader proscription of police conduct. The
focus in Williams upon the capacity of the suspect to interpose
counsel, rather than upon the compelling nature of the police conduct, suggests that conduct which is arguably not coercive may
nevertheless constitute the sort of trickery which is protected
against by the right to counsel. If one accepts the broader view of
interrogation under Miranda, there appears to be little difference
between Miranda and Williams in face to face confrontation under
custodial circumstances. The differences are more strongly evident
in surreptitious or non-custodial circumstances, where Miranda
protection may not apply, but where the Williams protections may.
II.

TIME OF COMMENCEMENT

The differences in the scope of protection offered by Williams
and Miranda become relevant only after the protections are operative. Yet, Miranda and Williams apparently operate on different
timetables.
A. Brewer v. Williams

The question of when the right to counsel attaches was not a critical issue in Williams because the state conceded that the right had
already attached at the time in question. 91 The Court, nevertheless,
stated the rule that the right to counsel attaches at or after the time
that judicial proceedings have been initiated. 92 Linking the right to
counsel to the initiation of judicial proceedings finds support in the
cases that apply the right to counsel theory to pre-trial proceedings. In Powell v. Alabama, 93 the Court held that the right to counsel should apply during any "critical period" when investigation
and consultation were essential to protect the fairness of the trial.
In these cases, however, the Court was not concerned with police
conduct. Rather, the Court's concern was with the imbalance
created in the judicial system by the absence of an effective advofifth amendment rights. Under such an assumption it can be argued that Miranda was not
intended to combat inherent compulsion alone, but that it was meant to counteract any governmental compulsion, of which inherent compulsion is the worst case. The Miranda warnings are not suggestions to the suspect of rights he can assert, but are descriptions of rights
he already has, of which he may remind the police. Thus, the violation of the right to counsel
in Miranda should be tested under the same focus as that in Williams and both are violated
by the jail cell plant.
91 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399.
92 Id. at 398.
93 'l2.7 U.S. 45 (1932).
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cate for the suspect during the early stages of the case, and the
danger of rendering meaningless the right to counsel at trial. 94
The Court has extended its time of attachment rule to certain
cases involving police conduct. For example, in United States v.
Wade, 95 the Court held that the right to counsel applied to a corporeal lineup. In Kirby v. Illinois, 96 however, the Court limited the
Wade decision to lineups occuring after the accused had been indicted. Indictment was the judicial proceeding which triggered the
sixth amendment right to counsel. 97
Arguably the "critical period" language of Powell is inappropriate in the self-incrimination cases, since the elicitation of a confession before judicial proceedings have begun is as harmful to the
suspect as a confession obtained afterwards. The Kirby decision,
however, suggests that only after judicial proceedings have commenced has the prosecutor committed himself to prosecute. 98 This
commitment, according to Kirby, is what the sixth amendment
focusses on in guaranteeing the right to counsel in all ''criminal
prosecutions. " 99 The difficulty with this reasoning is that it does
not go far enough in analyzing the threat which the prosecutor can
pose to the suspect. To the prosecutor, the prosecution may begin
long before judicial proceedings commence. The prosecutor could
decide to develop the evidence for his case before he begins any
judicial proceedings, 100 and take advantage of the inherently coercive power of custodial interrogations. Kirby further suggests
that the aid of an attorney is not necessary before judicial proceedings have commenced because at that point the suspect does not
face the "intricacies" of the criminal law .101 This reasoning, how•• Id .
•• 388 U .s. 218 (1967).
96 406 u .s. 682 (1972).
97
Id. at 689. The Court stated:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is
the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only
then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural crimin!ll law. It is this
point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to
which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
os 1d.
•• See note 5 supra. Kirby does not consider why criminal "prosecutions" under the language of the sixth amendment commence when judicial proceedings have begun, while criminal "cases" under the language of the fifth amendment begin with custodial police interrogations.
100
In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), for example, the suspect argued
that the prosecutor purposefully delayed his indictment to take advantage of the suspect's
lesser rights at the pre-indictment stage.
101
See note 97 supra.
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ever, does not and should not apply to police interrogations. In
Massiah, for example, the suspect was not confronted with any intricacies of law, but was held to be protected by the right to counsel. To the suspect, the prosecution no doubt commences once he
believes the prosecutor desires to imprison him. 102
If the expressed reasoning of Kirby does not explain the rule it
adopts, perhaps the Court felt that it had to place some limitation
on the right to counsel, but felt it could not state its decision in such
terms. 103 Similarly, the commencement of judicial proceedings
may have been perceived by the Kirby Court as a point of public
focus on the judicial system and, therefore, the rule laid down gave
the appearance of being just. 104 Due to its arbitrariness, the Kirby
102
Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477 ("It is at this point [of custodial interrogations] that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences .... ").
103 Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against
the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 732-33 (1974), suggests the
Court felt constrained by practical consideration:

At most, therefore, Kirby, if limited to pure sixth amendment analysis, might have
adopted the custody approach [requiring an attorney if the suspect is in custody]
....[T]his approach would have posed a serious threat to the present police practice of conducting prompt on-the-scene identifications. It can reasonably be assumed that the Supreme Court was not prepared to deprive the police of the flexibility. Kirby's reinterpretation of the sixth amendment may, therefore, have been
dictated by the impractical consequences that would have followed a custody approach.
One must ask, however, if this reasoning is readily applicable to the Williams situation. Arguably the police should be free to question a suspect in the absence of counsel to make a
quick determination whether the suspect would be pursued as a potentially guilty party.
That freedom is already restricted by the Miranda decision. Thus, the applicability of the
Kirby rule to Williams turns on the mechanical application of the sixth amendment rule
rather than on an analysis of the purpose the protection fulfills in police interrogations.
10
• Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 82-83.
There are alternatives to the Kirby rule. In Escobedo the Court held that the right to counsel commenced when the investigation first focussed on the suspect. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
That standard was short-lived. Miranda reinterpreted Escobedo as involving the fifth
amendment and stated that "focus" meant custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444 n.4. In
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court summarily rejected an argument by
Hoffa that his right to counsel had been violated when an undercover agent overheard a
conversation between Hoffa and his lawyer. Hoffa argued that the right to counsel commenced when the investigation focussed on him. The final nail in the coffin for Escobedo
was Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), which explicitly rejected the "focus"
test.
Another alternative is the so-called New York rule. In New York the right to counsel
commences once an attorney enters the proceedings. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). This rule has some federal support in a footnote in
Miranda, which stated that Escobedo's sixth amendment rights were violated when the
police refused to allow Escobedo's attorney to speak with him despite the request. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465 n.35. See Rothblatt & Pitier, Police Interrogation: Warnings and
Waiver - Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 494-96 (1967). The approach has, however, been rejected by lower federal courts. See United States v. Masullo,
489 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Davis v. Burke, 408 F.2d 779 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969).
One commentator has argued against the use of the New York rule. Kamisar, What Is
Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 86-91. The objection to the New York rule is that it gives
added protection to a person wealthy enough to afford a lawyer or fortunate enough to have
others obtain a lawyer for him. The court in Masullo stated that this would be an impetus for
organized criminals to appoint "house counsel." One means ofreducing the impact of such
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rule may be both too broad and too narrow in the police interrogation context. It is too narrow because it leaves the police free to act
before judicial proceedings have begun and to use the fruits of such
actions at trial. 105 It is too broad because once judicial proceedings
have begun the rule may eliminate the possibility of police action to
elicit a confession even if the actions do not coerce the suspect.
In Williams, the Court noted that Williams' right to counsel had
commenced because a warrant had been issued for his arrest and
he had been arraigned. 106 While there is little question that arraignment is sufficiently judicial to trigger the right to counsel, 107
some courts have suggested that an arrest warrant alone may be
sufficient. 108 In considering an earlier point in time, such as the
time of a warrantless arrest, problems of delineating limits arise. If
police action alone were sufficient to trigger the right to counsel,
arguably the Court should return to a rule which focusses on the
nature of the police conduct, such as the custodial interrogation
test or "focus" test. 109 Since these tests have been rejected by the
Court and are contrary to the Kirby rule, the Court is unlikely to
adopt one of these tests.
The right to counsel under Williams is triggered once judicial
proceedings have commenced against the suspect. These proceedings may take the form of an indictment or possibly an arrest warrant. There seems to be little justification for this rule except for
the desire of the court to limit the potency of the right to counsel.
B. Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda becomes operative when the suspect is subjected to
custodial interrogation.11° This can occur either before or after the
inequalities would be to make an attorney available to anyone who is taken into custody.
One state has already done so. See N .M. Stat. Ann. § 31-15-12c (1978). The controversy
which Miranda has engendered, however, makes further expansion of this device unlikely.
10
• See United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437,441 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1057 (1968). The government agent who gathered the incriminating statements in Massiah
carried on similar activities against the other co-conspirators. The Second Circuit noted,
however, that since these other co-conspirators were not under indictment at the time the
agent met them, they were not protected by Massiah.
10
• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399.
107
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
108
See P-atler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974); State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358,
543 P.2d 952 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); People v. Flores, 236 Cal. App. 2d
807, 46 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 26 (1968) ("An arrest is the initial stage of criminal prosecution. It is intended to
vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed .... "). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (a determination of probable cause after detention is not a critical state re-.
quiring the presence of counsel); Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 85
n.503.
10
• If the Court did not rely on a test which focussed on function rather than procedure, it
would create an arbitrary inequality among suspects and might discourage the use of a warrant. See United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
110
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
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initiation of judicial proceedings. If it occurs afterwards, then presumably the Williams doctrine would also apply and the suspect
could choose whichever approach best served his needs.
The custodial interrogation standard raises a theoretical problem. The Miranda decision mandates a right to counsel warning.11 1
Yet, according to Williams, there can be no right to counsel before
judicial proceedings have commenced. The co-existence of these
different standards might be attributed to the Court's interpretation
of Miranda as a fifth amendment case rather than as an application
of the sixth amendment.11 2 Thus, Miranda could be read to provide
for a right to counsel but not the right to counsel.
One can argue that this position is too narrow a reading of
Miranda. It is true that Miranda's primary purpose appears to be
the development of a prophylactic rule which will protect fifth
amendment rights. But that does not mean the sixth amendment is
uninvolved. Massiah, for example, reflects a history of using the
sixth amendment to protect fifth amendment rights. The mere fact
that only one right is involved - self-incrimination - rather than
the larger spectrum of rights typically associated with the need for
counsel, does not mean that the right to counsel is therefore limited
to that one right. For example, the right to counsel in corporeal
lineup cases protects the due process right to a fair trial.11 3 The
right to counsel in these cases, however, is not considered to be a
prophylactic rule protecting due process rights, but rather a right
unto its own.
It is more reasonable to recognize Miranda as an application of
the sixth amendment for the limited purpose of counteracting the
threat which a compelled confession could have on the eventual
trial.11 4 This view would avoid much of the theoretical confusion
created by the conflict between the Williams and Miranda rules as
to when the right to counsel attaches. The Williams-Kirby rhetoric,
requiring judicial proceedings to have commenced, would have to
give way to allow the right to counsel to commence at custodial interrogations - a point at which the suspect, probably believes the
prosecution has commenced. The purpose of the limitation to judicial proceedings, that is, not overexpanding the right to counsel, is
served by allowing the right to exist only in those circumstances
where there exists an inherent threat to fifth amendment interests.115
Id.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581
n.6 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1975); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 (1972).
113
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
114
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
115
The Kirby decision itself would have to be re-thought. The desirability of limiting the
111

112
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In the present state of the law, there appears to be two different
approaches to determining when the right to counsel commences.
Under Williams, the right to counsel attaches once judicial proceedings have commenced. Under Miranda, the "right to.counsel"
commences during custodial interrogations and such activities may
occur before or after judicial proceedings have been initiated.
III.

WAIVER

The ease with which an accused may waive his rights is a measure of the strength of that right. 116 Generally, the standard for
waiver reflects the amount and force of evidence which the Court
will require before it will find that a waiver occurred. In Johnson v.
Zerbst 117 the Court declared that a waiver of a constitutional right
must be a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right.
Nevertheless, the standard for waiver may differ in different circumstances.
A. Brewer v. Williams
The waiver issue is the critical issue in Williams. The state argued that Williams was aware of his right to counsel and therefore
his voluntary actions constituted a waiver of the right. 118 The
Court rejected this reasoning and held that the state courts had unconstitutionally placed the burden of proof on Williams rather than
on the prosecution.11 9 If the only difficulty were the burden of
proof, Williams would have been a simple case. But the Court went
further to describe what standard of waiver should be applied by
the lower courts. The precise standard is difficult to ascertain. On
the one hand, the court stated that the standard for waiver before
trial was the same as that at trial. 120 On the other hand the Court
described the proscribed conduct in a manner which suggested a
lesser standard. 121
The strictest standard for waiver which the Court in Williams
might have adopted requires the presence of an attorney to waive
right to counsel may be justified on the basis of the importance of on-the-scene identifications and the availability of alternative means of proof of the accuracy of the identification
technique for the defense. See Note, Pretrial Rightto Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974).
The hybrid approach suggested here has the salutary effect of directing the courts' attention to the hazards of police conduct rather than to the abstractions of the need for counsel
after judicial proceedings have commenced. See Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra
note 26, at 81.
116
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,484,384 N.Y.S. 2d 419,422,348 N.E.2d 894,898
(1976) ("Indeed, it may be said that a right too easily waived is no right at all.").
111
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
11
• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401-02.
11
• Id. at 404.
uo Id.
12 1
Id. at 405.
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the sixth amendment right. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that the logic of the majority opinion dictated this result. 122
The majority responded that they need not reach that issue since
they could find the absence of a waiver regardless of the presence
of an attorney .123 Nevertheless, the idea of requiring presence of
counsel warrants consideration.
There are two bases for the argument that an attorney must be
present before right to counsel can be waived. First, it has been
argued that Williams should be interpreted to mean that after a
given point the suspect is presumed to need the assistance of counsel in any interaction with the state, as a protection against all deliberate elicitations. 124 If this is true, it is reasonable that the decision to waive the right to counsel should also only be made after
consultation with an attorney. A person who is incapable of directing his own affairs in interactions with the state must certainly be
incapable of independently deciding whether he could use the assistance of counsel.1 25
Second, the majority opinion in Williams suggests that the
standard for waiver before trial is the same as the standard at
trial. 126 In Faretta v. California ,127 the Court stated the standard to
be that the defendant must be "made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that 'he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " 128 Arguably this
standard will never be met by someone acting alone outside of the
presence of ajudicial officer. During ajudicial proceeding an independent judicial officer can explain the dangers and disadvantages
to the defendant. During a police interrogation only the police and
an attorney are realistically available to make such explanations.
The presence of an attorney is necessary, for it would be unreasonable to rely on the police to explain the very means by which the
suspect may avoid their inquiries. 129

122

430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 405-06.
124
See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
12
• See People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
177-78 (1965) ("The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most
needs counsel."), cited with approval in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 471.
126
430 U.S. at 404 ("[l]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege' .... This strict standard applies
equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of
pretrial proceedings.").
127
422 u .s. 806 (1975).
128
Id. at 835.
129
Kamisar, Kauper's Judicial Examination of the Accused Forty Years Later-Some
Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15, 25 (1974) ("Chief Judge Bazelon
has put it less kindly: "A system that places reliance on police warnings places[s] a mouse
under the protective custody of the cat.' '').
123
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Chief Justice Burger argued that this requirement is inconsistent
with the Faretta holding. It is not inconsistent, however, if Faretta
is limited to the at-trial situation or if one interprets Faretta as allowing a person to dismiss his attorney after a first consultation in
the police interrogation situation. The Chief Justice also objected
to the requirement of consultation before waiver because it "operates to 'imprison a man in his privileges,' ... It denigrates an individual to a nonperson whose free will has become hostage to a
lawyer." 130 It is difficult to understand how consultation would
subject a suspect to the desires of his attorney if the suspect retains
the ability to dismiss his attorney. Perhaps the Chief Justice believes an attorney has an undue control over his client. If so, the
issue in Williams would appear to be whether the Court prefers the
control of the suspect's attorney over the control the police can
exert. That the police can exercise such control was acknowledged
by the Court in Miranda. Moreover, the requirement of an attorney's presence is not unreasonable. The New York courts have recently reaffirmed their commitment to such a rule. 131
The majority in Williams indicates, however, that the Court does
not intend to require the presence of counsel before a valid waiver
will be found. The Court suggests, in its description of what Detective Leaming did wrong, that a lesser standard of waiver may operate in interrogations:
Despite Williams' express and implicit assertion of his
right to counsel, Detective Leaming proceeded to elicit incriminating statements from Williams. Leaming did not
A third argument can be made for the presence of an attorney before a waiver. The Code
of Professional Responsibility states that:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not ... communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or by law is authorized to do
so.
ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-104(1) (1977). By viewing the prosecutor as a lawyer, some have argued that once a suspect is represented it is
unethical to approach him in the absence of his attorney. United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d
llO (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Others have stated that this is no more than an administrative rule which they refuse to apply. Springer, id. (majority opinion).
130 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 419.
131 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976). See
McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §153, at 334 (E. Cleary ed. 1972)
("The New York rule seems more appropriate. While it is in theory possible for an accused
to form the mental state required for a waiver without consultation with an attorney who is
already in the case, the.danger of interrogators using this as a means of encouraging waivers
for impermissable purposes seems sufficient to justify a general rule requiring that if an accused is represented by counsel, he may not thereafter be interrogated without counsel's
presence unless he waives this right after consultation with counsel and in counsel's presence.").
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preface this effort by telling Williams that he had a right to
the presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all to ascertain whether Williams wished to relinquish that right. The
circumstances of record in this case thus provide no reasonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to
the assistance of counsel. 132
This language suggests that a waiver might have been possible if
Leaming had given Williams an additional warning of his sixth
amendment right and had asked if Williams wished to relinquish
that right. Such activities, however, certainly do not amount to an
explanation of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Furthermore, given the impact of the interrogative device used, the Christian Burial Speech, such additional comments would probably have
had little impact on Williams' state of mind. 133 An express request
for a waiver would be a helpful standard because the Court would
not have to assume the suspect's intent. But in Williams even an
express waiver would have been tainted by the coercive impact of
the interrogation.
It remains uncertain whether the majority intended their description to constitute a minimal requirement for a waiver, or merely a
statement that they could find no waiver despite the absence of
counsel. If the Court shares the fears of Chief Justice Burger, it
may refuse to require the presence of an attorney. Perhaps the
Court will accept evidence that the suspect could determine his
own best interests but set a demanding standard for such evidence
in the face of coercive techniques employed by the police. The evidence should be more than the mere presence of a warning and
perhaps even more than an express waiver .134
The issue of the extent to which a suspect must be aware of his
own best interests divided the majority and dissent in Williams.
The dissenters suggested that, as long as the suspect knew that he
had the right to counsel and was able to assert the right, any subsequent confession represents a waiver of the right. 135 Justice
White noted that Williams had assert<;:d his right several times before the Christian Burial Speech and was no less capable of re-

-132
133

430 U.S. at 405.
See Kamisar, Williams-Record, supra note I. Professor Kamisar argues that there
was not a single speech but a series of questions and pleas by Detective Leaming. There is
some evidence of this in the majority opinion's notation that Williams asserted his right several times. See text accompanying notes 8-14 supra. A single additional warning at any one
point probably would have had little effect.
u• Id.
135
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 433 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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asserting his right thereafter .136 This viewpoint is suggestive of the
voluntariness test: if the suspect knows his rights, the Court need
only ask if the confession was voluntary. 137 A more meaningful interpretation of the requisite knowledge for waiver is that the suspect must understand not only that he has a right but also the potential benefits which the presence of counsel could provide. This
interpretation is consistent with the standard of waiver expressed
in Faretta - that the suspect (defendant) will be allowed to proceedpro se only ifhe is aware of the dangers. 138 This interpretation
also avoids the pitfalls of the voluntariness rule. 139
This division over the issue of the standard for waiver is also reflected in the scope of proscribed conduct suggested by the majority and dissent. The dissenters' interpretation of the standard for
waiver would allow a broad range of police conduct. Only coercive
conduct that threatened to produce an involuntary confession
would be proscribed. As noted above, the dissenters did not believe that the Christian Burial Speech was coercive. 140 To the
majority, however, it appears that the critical determination was
whether Williams understood the potential benefits of counsel.
Any police conduct that interferred with the suspect's assessment

130
137

Id.
It is interesting to note, however, that Chief Justice Burger distinguished the voluntari-

ness test, quoting from Shnecklothe v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 n.25 (1973):
[T)he question whether a person has acted "voluntarily" is quite distinct from the
question whether he has "waived" a trial right. The former question, as we made
clear in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. [742,] 749, can be answered only by examining all the relevant circumstances to determine if he has been coerced. The latter question turns entirely on the extent of his knowledge.
430 U.S. at 418.
Chief Justice Burger believed this standard was fulfilled because Williams knew he had
the rightto counsel, the Court did not question his mental competence, and Williams knew
that leading the police to the body would incriminate himself. None of these facts, however,
indicate a knowledge of the benefits which the presence of counsel might provide. This is
presumably the "knowledge" to which Shnecklothe referred. Furthermore, the Court
clearly does suggest a limitation of Williams' mental competence by finding that the Christian Burial Speech was an interrogation. To accept Chief Justice Burger's dissent and also
accept the fact that the Speech was an interrogation is to suggest that the Court need only
ask if the suspect's mental competence was retained after the inducement by the police. As
noted in the text, this is no different from the voluntariness test. Chief Justice Burger then
argues that no interrogation was proven "simply because it [the Speech] was followed by an
incriminating disclosure." 430 U.S. at 419-20. This states the view that if the confession
were not the result of the Speech it would therefore be admissible. This viewpoint is no
different than the view that the confession was voluntary. Furthermore, it is difficult.to believe that the Speech was not intended to elicit the confession (and not merely a chance precursor), because the majority quotes Detective Learning's testimony admitting his intent. Id.
at 339. The issue in Williams was not the presence of a confession, but the manner in which
the police produced the confession. See id. at 408 (Marshall, J ., concurring) ("It is this intentional police misconduct -not good police practice - that the Court rightly condemns.").
138
See note 112 supra.
139
See notes 32-34 supra.
140
See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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of those benefits will constitute an elicitation in violation of the
right. A suggestion by the police, for example, that it would be
more "decent" if the suspect confessed, while not necessarily
coercive, is a recommendation by the police that the suspect not
assert the right to counsel. 141 Such a suggestion should constitute
an elicitation, and, therefore, proscribed conduct.

B. Miranda v. Arizona
The primary impact of Miranda was to require the police to warn
a suspect of his rights and obtain a waiver of those rights before
subjecting him to custodial interrogation. There is, however, a second level Miranda right that controls the possibility of waiver after
the right to silence or the right to counsel have been asserted.
Under Miranda, an assertion of the right to silence or to counsel
affects the standard for waiver, at least according to lower court
interpretations of that decision. If the right is never asserted, a
court may find that there was an implied waiver of the right - that
is, that the actions of the accused effectuated a waiver of his rights
without an express statement. 142 Once a right is asserted under
Miranda, however, the courts may apply a stricter standard. If the
suspect asserts his right to silence, under Michigan v. Mosley 143
the police may interrogate the suspect as long as the police
scrupulously observe the suspect's right to cut off questioning.
Mosley suggests that by answering subsequent questions the suspect waives his right to silence. Although this is an implied waiver,
it will be carefully scrutinized by the courts to assure the freedom
of the suspect to reassert his desire to stop the questioning.
141 It is conceivable that the statements by the police have no effect upon the judgement of
the suspect and are, therefore, not proscribed. It should be the state's burden to prove this.
The Court may have an occasion to consider such proof in Rhode Island v. Innis (R.I. Aug. 9
1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3566 (Feb. 20, 1979) (No. 78-1076). In that case the suspect
asserted his right to counsel under Miranda and during the ride to the police station after an
arrest passed a school for handicapped children. An arresting officer commented, "God forbid one of them [the children] might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." See N .Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, at B7, col. I. The case does not, apparently, involve
the right to counsel under Williams, but the issue is the same. Once the right to counsel
began the police should have been proscribed from activity which deliberately suggested
that the suspect not assert his right. See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at
78 n.461 ("A forceful argument can be made that once a suspect asserts his Miranda right to
counsel he is essentially in the same position as one whose Massiah right to counsel has
attached.").
142 Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070, 1072 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marchildon, 519 F.2d 337,343 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); United States v. Ganter, 436 F.2d 364,370 (7th Cir.
1970); Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970);
Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1035 (1969). See
also NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS
AFTER MIRANDA 50-51 (1975).
143 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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If a suspect asserts his right to counsel, the standard of waiver to
be applied is less certain. Miranda stated that "[i]f an individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present. " 144 If the police claim that the suspect consulted his attorney but later made a confession, the Court noted
that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retain or appoint counsel. " 145 The lower courts have split over whether the burden is so
heavy as to require the presence of an attorney before waiver .146
If the Supreme Court considers the issue, it seems unlikely that it
will require the presence of an attorney for a waiver under
Miranda. It could have decided the issue under Williams, but
suggested a lesser standard. 147 Therefore, if the right to counsel
does not require the presence of an attorney for a waiver, it is improbable that the Court would find that the prophylactic rule of
Miranda requires such a presence.
In his dissent to Williams, Justice White argued that a waiver
under Williams should be no different than a waiver under Miranda
and that the latter could be found by implication from the actions of
the accused. 148 From this he argued that Williams had waived his
right to counsel. This implied waiver standard for Miranda is troubling. First, the implied waiver standard ignores the impact of
police action in custodial surroundings. The right to counsel allows
the suspect to intelligently choose his course of action. 149 Once the
suspect asserts the right to counsel under Miranda, or once the judicial system presumes that the suspect is incapable of proceeding
144

384 U.S. at 474.
Id. at 475.
The Fifth Circuit has held that the heavy burden is impossible to meet unless counsel is
present. Nash v. Estelle, 560 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Blair, 470
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit has held that the right to
counsel may be waived under the Mosely standard. U.S. v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d
482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2266 (1978). Other cases have decided the issue without
considering it as directly as these cases. See United States v. Charlton, 565 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tucker,
435 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971).
147
See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
148
430 U.S. at 435-36. The cases cited by Justice White for the proposition are cited at
note 142 supra. These cases do indicate that a waiver may be implied by acts, but none of
them suggest such a conclusion after the suspect has once asserted his right to counsel.
149
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469 ("The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his
privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we
delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence
and speech remains unfettered .... ").
145
146
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under the Williams-Kirby doctrine, 150 one cannot thereafter assume that the suspect's actions are intelligent. The request for
counsel constitutes an open expression of inability on the part of
the suspect to protect his own interests. This inability is compounded by the reality that the only source of information available
to the suspect is from the government agent. Thus, there is no way
to assume that after the suspect says he lacks the capability to
choose he has somehow regained that capability . 151 The Court
must either provide an attorney or possibly measure the waiver by
the at-trial standard and ask if the suspect has the intelligence to
decide in fact.
A second troubling aspect of this implied waiver standard is that
it establishes a dichotomy between Miranda and Williams. 152 Williams rejects the argument that a suspect can impliedly waive his
1 • 0 Such a presumption arises, for example, where the suspect is faced with the "intricacies" of criminal law. See note 97 supra.
1 1
•
Justice White, concurring in the result in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, ll0 n.2
(1975), explains:

[T]he reasons to keep the lines of communication between the authorities and the
accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto. The
authorities may then communicate with him through an attorney. More to the
point, the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal
with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with
skepticism.
This statement haunted Justice White in Williams. He argued it was inapplicable for two
reasons. First, Williams did not indicate a desire to be free of questions outside the presence
of counsel. B"ut Williams' statement that he would tell all after he consulted with his Des
Moines attorney was an indication that he did not wish to speak to Leaming. Furthermore,
Justice White's argument suggests that a suspect must not only assert his desire for counsel
but also ask that in counsel's absence no questions be asked of him. Yet Miranda states that
the right to counsel assertion alone must stop the interrogation. See note 144 supra. Second,
Justice White argued that the Christian Burial Speech was not an interrogation. This argument is relevant only if one accepts his assumption that the case should be decided on
Miranda grounds. Williams does not require interrogation. Even if it were a Miranda case,
the argument is unpersuasive, for Miranda stated: "Any evidence that the accused was
threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his privilege." 384 U.S. at 476.
Justice White observed in his dissent that the only basis for the majority decision is that it
distinguishes between being asked a question (the right to counsel) and being protected from
answering a question (Miranda). This he described as a "wafer-thin distinction" which cannot determine whether a guilty murderer should go free. 430 U.S. at 436. Clearly, however,
the asking of the question is the means by which the police both interfere with the right to
counsel and compel a response in violation of the fifth amendment. The answer is merely the
intended result. Whether the distinction can withstand the attack that it frees a guilty murderer depends both upon the importance one attaches to the right to counsel and the importance one attaches to any other procedural limitation upon the police.
152 This dichotomy has been recognized by several courts which have relied upon the
Massiah doctrine when Miranda appeared to provide less protection. See United States v.
Miller, 432 F. Supp. 382, 387-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d without opinion, 573 F.2d 1297 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Satterfield, 417 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States ex
rel. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 465 F.2d
1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972); United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324,
327 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting).
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right to counsel. The difference may be explained by stating that
Williams protects sixth amendment rights, whereas Miranda protects fifth amendment rights. It is better, however, to view
Miranda as giving the suspect the freedom to decide. This is the
same purpose the sixth amendment fulfills for all other rights, and
the waiver of its protections should be measured as it is in other
sixth amendment situations. 153 Justice White is correct in noting
that there should be no difference in the standard for waiver between Miranda and Williams - but the standard chosen should be
that of Williams and not implied waiver. 154
IV.

TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY

OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Throughout the article it has been suggested that Miranda and
Williams are closely related doctrines. Where differences in application have occurred they have been due to the view that Miranda's focus is on compulsion whereas Williams' focus is on the ability of the suspect to assert his right to counsel. It is suggested that a
unified theory can be constructed.
It is essential to a unified theory that Miranda be re-analysed. It
has been viewed by the Court as a mechanism to protect fifth
amendment rights alone. Since the key to the fifth amendment is
compulsion, the Court could apply its protections earlier in the
criminal process than the right to counsel and rely on a less strict
standard for waiver. There is, however, a sixth amendment side to
Miranda which is not tied to the presence of compulsion. In referring to the need for counsel the Court noted that the attorney's
presence was necessary to allow the suspect freedom to choose
whether to speak to the police. 155 This concept appears to be no
different than the view expressed that the freedom to interpose
counsel was protected by Massiah. It can be argued, therefore,
that Miranda applies the sixth amendment for the more limited
purpose of protecting the suspect's ability to cut off questioning. 156
The focus is not on the compulsion but on the ability to assert the
right.
153
See United States v. Wendra, 343 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N. Y. 1972) (rejecting an implied
waiver of right to counsel under Miranda).
154
It is interesting to note that in Williams the Court's discussion of the proper standard
for waiver quotes from the lower court's discussion of Miranda. This suggests that whatever
standard is eventually established, it should be the same under either doctrine.
155 384 U.S. at 469 ("Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is
indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and
speech remain unfettered .... ") (emphasis added).
156 There are several other aspects of Miranda which suggest its reliance on the sixth
amendment. First, the decision notes that custodial interrogation was what the Court meant
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This focus is an important factor in strengthening Miranda. The
Miranda warnings are not suggestions of rights which can be used
by the suspect, they are descriptions of rights the suspect already
has and of which he may choose to remind the police. 157 Thus, the
presence of compulsion may be important in deciding whether the
Miranda doctrine applies. Once applicable, the focus of decision
shifts to grounds closely related to sixth amendment decision whether the suspect had the ability to use his rights as a barrier.
Taking this view, the difficulties which arise in the interaction
between Miranda and Williams can be more easily resolved. Once
a suspect is in custody, the term "interrogation" in Miranda
should be read as broadly as it is meant in Massiah or Williams.
Custody creates the potential for compulsion because the police
are in control and any post-facto judgments must rely on their version of the facts. The custody factor still distinguishes the doctrines
but it is the only distinguishing characteristic. The time at which
the right to counsel attaches is at custodial interrogation or, in the
absence of custodial interrogation, at the initiation of judicial proceedings. The Court may still wish to assume that the prosecution
represents a greater threat to-the suspect after judicial proceedings
have begun and on that basis apply a proscription to non-custodial
conduct. The right to counsel may be waived only under the strict
standard of Williams. The doctrine of implied waiver, based on the
absence of compulsion, is inapplicable. The potential for compulsion signals the availability of the right, and, once available, the
waiver of the right to counsel under Miranda is theoretically no different than a waiver under Williams. The fact that a suspect "asserts" his right to counsel should make no legal difference, but it
presents an important factual distinction. Once the right is asserted, the Court should not thereafter assume that a suspect can
by "focus" in Escobedo. The Escobedo decision clearly relies on the right to counsel for
protection. As the Court stated: "We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an
explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution - that 'No person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that 'the accused
shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel ... .' " 384 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
Second, the Court noted that custodial interrogation represented the point at which criminal adversarial proceedings begin. 384 U.S. at 477. Although these are not judicial proceedings, it is notable that the law in Miranda was involved with removing the fifth amendment
from the limitation of judicial presence and felt that custody was the significant turning point
for the criminal process.
157
See, e.g., Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. at 471 ("In Carnley v. Cochran ... we stated:
'[l]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on request.' This proposition applies with equal force in
the context of providing counsel to protect an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege in the
face of interrogation .... Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must
be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer .... ").
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regain the necessary intelligence to decide what is in his own best
interests and should require the presence of an attorney before a
waiver will be accepted.
CONCLUSION

At present there are two sets of protections available to the accused who has made self-incriminating remarks: those under
Miranda and those under Williams. A study of these protections
suggests that they are theoretically very close. Nevertheless, there
are differences in the applicability of either set of protections. Williams proscribes all deliberate elicitations, while Miranda strikes
out at the narrower range of police conduct involving interrogations. The latter requires the presence of coercion, the former requires only an interference with the ability of the suspect to interpose his attorney between himself and the state.
Williams declared that the right to counsel commences when judicial proceedings such as arraignment or a warrant for arrest have
been initiated. Miranda rights may attach before that. These differences are perhaps reconciled by interpreting Miranda as nothing
more than a fifth amendment case. But they may be better reconciled by recognizing Miranda as a "limited purpose" sixth
amendment rule.
Williams adopts a strict standard for waiver, although it may not
be so strict as to require the presence of counsel before a waiver
can be accepted. Williams suggests that a waiver must be express
and it will not be found after an interrogation unless there are
further warnings. Some have argued that there is a lesser standard
for waiver under Miranda, but there is no reason that the two
standards of waiver should not be the same.
To avoid the theoretical and practical confusion which Williams
and Miranda may create, this article has proposed a unified rule.
Under that approach, Miranda is to be viewed as an application of
the sixth amendment, but applicable only where fifth amendment
rights are threatened.
-Mitchell Leibson Chyette

